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The December 2019 UK General
Election: Reflections




1 The 2019 general election was the election that the Conservative party should not have
won. A party that had for over three years been bitterly divided on Brexit, by far and
away the dominant issue of British politics,  was seeking a fourth term in office.  Its
achievements  in  government  in  terms  of  policy  outcomes  since  the  2016  Brexit
referendum were uninspiring at best. It had overseen a decade of austerity that had
stretched the social fabric of the country thin.
2 A divided party, a party worn out by the travails of nine years of difficult government, a
party without a substantial record of policy success; by all the normal rules of politics,
this election should have been there for the taking by the opposition.
3 Yet the Conservative party not only won, but won well, achieving a majority of 80, the
best performance by the party since Mrs Thatcher in the election of 1987. This was at
the  outer  edge  of  what  even  the  most  optimistic  of  party  supporters  thought  was
achievable, way out-doing David Cameron’s hard fought majority victory in 2015 and a
major turn-around on Mrs May’s dismal effort in 2017.
4 Why did the Conservative party win so handsomely? Is this decisive outcome a sign of
the end of Brexit divisions in the UK? Have the Conservatives succeeded in breaking the
mold of British politics?
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The Conservatives’ handsome victory
5 Through  a  hard-fought  campaign,  two  main  factors  intertwined  to  produce  this
emphatic  outcome:  Brexit  and the  failure  of  the  leadership of  the  main opposition
party, Labour.
6 The  election  outcome  can  be  seen  as  the  culmination  of  the  2016  EU  referendum
campaign. British politics since June 2016 had been riven by the question of whether,
and if so, how the UK should leave the EU. Through the three tortured years of the May
premiership, everything remained in doubt.
7 The  endeavour  started  bravely  enough,  with  the  ambiguous,  if  ultimately  vacuous,
slogan: ‘Brexit means Brexit’. But, confronted with the hard reality that there was a
binary choice to be made between a close relationship along the lines of the European
Economic Area or a looser Canada-style free trade agreement,  the May government
became paralyzed between the opposing factions within her own party. 
8 Having ruled out the continuation of free movement, the logic of her position drove her
to  espouse  a  relationship  based on a  free  trade  agreement.  Belatedly,  she  came to
recognise the risk that this would pose both to existing patterns of trade between the
UK and the EU and to the coherence of the UK Union itself, specifically in relation to
Northern  Ireland.  Her  attempt  to  find  a  middle  way  for  the  future  relationship,
retaining  close  regulatory  alignment  in  an  unprecedented  customs  arrangement,
pleased few. But she never got to test whether it was a sustainable basis for a future
relationship. In three times of asking, Parliament decisively rejected the Withdrawal
Agreement she had negotiated.
9 With the opposition parties unwilling to support the May deal  but unable to win a
majority  in  Parliament  for  any  alternative,  Brexit  policy  was  at  an  impasse.  The
divisions generated by the referendum campaign, far from healing, were as deep as
ever. Many still believed that somehow Brexit could be averted, many others despaired
at the failure to deliver on the outcome of the referendum.
10 Into this  toxic  mix the new leader of  the Conservative  party  from July  2019,  Boris
Johnson, injected a proposition of simple clarity.  The UK would leave the EU, come
what may, and would negotiate what could only be described as a hard Brexit, a free
trade agreement with minimal regulatory alignment. To give credence to that policy
position, he unceremoniously ejected from the Conservative party those who would not
fall into line behind it.
11 This is the proposition that he took into the election campaign, under the taut and
effective  slogan  of  ‘Get  Brexit  Done’.  Despite  having  missed  his  first  self-imposed
deadline for leaving the EU of 31 October and despite the perceived chicanery of his
attempt  to  prorogue  Parliament,  this  was  the  position  that  cut  through  with  the
electorate.
12 Brexit  was no doubt  the dominant issue of  the campaign.  The country had a  clear
choice  before  it,  to  end  the  prevarication  of  three  years  of  political  turmoil  or  to
commit to a further re-opening of the terms of exit and an uncertain future beyond
that. Despite Opposition attempts to bring more quotidian issues to the fore, notably
the NHS, for those who voted for the Conservative party, Brexit was the top issue.1
13 The Conservative party succeeded broadly in uniting those in favour of Brexit behind
it. According to YouGov post-election analysis, the Conservatives increased their share
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of Leave voters from the 2017 election from 65% to 74%.2 The Brexit party in the end
did not pose a serious challenge. Choosing not to stand in seats where the Conservative
candidate  was  firmly  in  the  Brexit  camp,  its  share  of  the  vote  fell  to  a  mere  2%.
Meanwhile, those who opposed Brexit, at least in the form proposed by Johnson, split
their vote between the opposition parties. Labour actually lost share of the Remainer
vote, down from 55% in 2017 to just 49%. 
14 The election thereby settled the question that had remained open since June 2016. The
UK would leave the EU, and did so formally on 31 January 2020, and would thereafter
negotiate a thin free trade agreement which would allow for substantial divergence
from the EU market.
15 The Conservatives seized the advantage of real clarity on the big issue of the day. They
were able to capitalise on the anger and disappointment in the country that the Brexit
promise  had  not  already  been  delivered.  Their  task  in  doing  this  was  made
immeasurably easier by the ambiguity of the Labour party’s position on Brexit.
 
Labour’s dramatic defeat 
16 Riven by its own divisions on Brexit, and with Jeremy Corbyn as a leader who was at
best ambivalent in his own attitude to the European Union, Labour had struggled to
create a policy that had cut through with the voters. There was no easy middle ground
for Labour that would satisfy both their young and professional supporters in urban
centres and university towns and their more traditional  voters in Leave-supporting
seats in the midlands and north of England.
17 The party went through a series of every more tortured compromises. By committing
to a renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement and a subsequent referendum on the
deal  alongside  an  option  to  remain,  but  unable  to  say  what  it  would  as  a  party
recommend in that referendum, the party’s position in the election campaign left many
people confused and, at the margins, laid it open to ridicule. The policy might have
been sufficient to draw back some Remain voters who were put off by the unequivocal
commitment of the Liberal Democrats to outright revocation of the Article 50 letter,
but it had no reach into Labour’s own Brexit-leaning heartlands.
18 Labour did its best to make the election about anything other than Brexit. It played the
NHS card, not unsuccessfully, appealing to the issue on which it is traditionally more
trusted than the Conservatives and which is usually at or near the top of the list of
voter concerns. It  produced a manifesto that was jammed with expensive promises.
Many of these had popular appeal. Nationalisation, particularly of industries like rail
and water, has majority public support. Promising free broadband for all caught the
public imagination. 
19 In an age weary of austerity, the general commitment to increased public expenditure
and an increased role for the state had resonance. This was a manifesto for all;  the
benefits pledged were largely universal, not just for the poor and vulnerable. Although
portrayed as a deeply socialist agenda, the manifesto – if that had been the limits of
what  Labour  delivered  in  government  –  would  not  have  taken  the  UK  out  of  the
mainstream  of  European  states  in  terms  of  the  role  of  the  state  and  the  ratio  of
government expenditure to GDP.
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20 But the manifesto failed to carry conviction. While individual policies were popular, the
whole  was  not  credible  with  the  electorate.  Too  many  believed  that  it  was  not
deliverable. This was down in part to the successful denigration of the manifesto by the
Conservatives and the other parties. But it was perhaps due most to the distrust of the
Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn.
21 Corbyn went into the election as the most unpopular opposition leader for the last 45
years.3 This was a hurdle that any leader would have struggled to overcome but proved
insuperable in an election where policy promises that might have had cut through in
more normal times were simply overshadowed by Brexit.
22 In short, Corbyn failed to repeat the success that had rattled the Conservatives in 2017
and reduced them to a minority government. It turned out that the more the electorate
got to know of him, the less impressed they were. He never dealt effectively with the
accusations of systemic anti-Semitism in the party over which he presided. For many
traditional Labour voters, he appeared to be unpatriotic and unsympathetic to their
concerns and their view of the world. Throughout the campaign, reports from those
canvassing on the doorstep confirmed that many in former Labour heartlands simply
did not trust Corbyn or believe that he would govern in the country’s best interests.
23 While  far  from  universally  popular  in  the  country,  Johnson,  by  contrast,  at  least
hovered in more or less neutral approval territory. Despite some unforced errors on
the campaign trail, notably an awkward handling of an incident when he was shown a
picture on a phone of a young child lying on a hospital floor4, his appeal among his own
supporters never wavered. Further, the Conservative manifesto, by itself committing to
an  end  to  austerity  with  increased  expenditure  promised  on  core  public  services,
allowed Johnson and his team to portray themselves as something new, not a retread of
the tired Conservative government of  Mrs May.  An end to austerity  buttressed the
promise  to  get  Brexit  done;  it  countered  Labour’s  own electoral  commitments  and
removed another reason for former Labour voters not to vote Conservative.
24 A combination of clarity on Brexit and widespread distrust of Corbyn were the key
elements in the Conservative victory. Although their vote share only went up by 1.2%,
cut through on Brexit united the majority of Leave supporters behind them. Fear of a
Corbyn-led government did the rest. For many Tory Remainers, the threat of a Corbyn
government was sufficient to persuade them to swallow their EU-credentials and vote
Conservative in spite of the promise of a hard Brexit. The Conservatives won an extra
47 seats to take their total to 365. Enough former Labour voters either stayed at home
or voted Conservative to reduce the Labour share of the vote by 7.8% and to lose them
59 seats, leaving them with only 203, the party’s worst result since 1935. So ended the
disastrous experiment with the Corbyn leadership.
25 The main image of the election outcome was undoubtedly the crumbling of the so-
called Red Wall of Labour seats in the midlands and north of England. Seats that had
voted Labour for decades fell to the Conservatives, in unlikely places like Bassetlaw,
Great Grimsby, the Rother Valley and Blyth Valley.
26 This was a dramatic outcome, a sweeping change to the political geography of the UK
that would have been unimaginable even a few years ago. But it reflected more than
just poor opposition leadership and a deep disgruntlement with the prevarication of
the political elite over Brexit. It was founded on the discontents that had driven the
outcome of the EU referendum itself.
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27 The  Brexit  referendum  resolved  itself  around  the  question  of  national  identity,
expressed through the prism of sovereignty. The argument may have been pitched in
economic  terms,  particularly  by  the  Remain  campaign,  and  many  other  strands  of
argument were interwoven with the central proposition. But ultimately the question
that the majority of voters answered in the affirmative was about taking back control, a
reassertion of independence of action for the UK outside the European Union.
28 There was undoubtedly a rich causality in why people in their millions believed that
the reassertion of British sovereignty was the right thing to do. There is little evidence
to suggest that many people in the UK concerned themselves with the technical details
of  how  the  EU  runs  it  affairs,  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the
European  Union  to  the  finer  points  of  qualified  majority  voting  in  the  Council  of
Ministers. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that concern about matters European
was  relatively  low  on  the  list  of  voter  priorities  in  the  run  into  the  2015  general
election.  Far higher up the list  were the quotidian issues that normally occupy the
frontal political vision – the NHS, jobs, crime, schools, the state of the local high street.
29 But the Leave campaign was brilliantly successful in latching their preoccupations onto
a deeper malaise, a sense of disenfranchisement and dislocation with deep roots and
multiple  causes.  Foremost  amongst  them  was,  no  doubt,  the  slow  afterburn  of
bitterness from the financial crash, a loss of trust in the institutions of the state, a
feeling of powerlessness in the face of globalisation and a centralisation of power, the
toxic  effects  of  austerity  and  the  impoverishment  of  the  public  realm.  Economic
rationality  took  a  back  seat.  The  European  Union,  distant  and  incomprehensible,
became a convenient symbol of all that was wrong with the world. Taking back control
was a way to reassert a national identity and the values associated with that identity.
30 The part of the UK which was most decisive in its rejection of the EU was England.
Outside of London, England voted by a margin of 11% to leave the EU. Tangled up in the
disaffection that drove the Brexit vote was undoubtedly a new current of nationalism
in England. The evidence suggests that those who identify most strongly as English
rather than British were most likely to vote Leave.5 In socio-economic terms,  these
voters are more concentrated in working class rather than professional communities.
In the 2019 election, the Conservative party was able to successfully appeal to their
values in a way that overturned the traditional allegiance to Labour. The Conservatives
won more voters in every social class than Labour.6 In the emerging world of identity
politics, the unambiguous positioning of the Conservatives on Brexit, but also on the
associated value set of flag, a tough approach on law and order and a marked disdain
for ‘wokeness’, paid dividends.
 
A divided polity
31 Where does this leave the United Kingdom as a political country? Boris Johnson has
successfully united the Conservatives around his position on Brexit, ending the long
European agony of the party, not through compromise, but simply by overwhelming
and marginalising the remaining pro-Europeans. The Conservative party is united. It
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will take an almost unimaginable political upheaval to dislodge the Conservatives from
government over the course of this Parliament and Labour has a mountain to climb to
be a credible contender for power at the next election. So are the divisions that have so
scarred the country through and beyond the EU referendum now over? How secure is
Johnson’s hold on the affections of the nation?
32 On the surface, this was a decisive victory. But beneath the surface, the UK remains a
divided polity, demographically, socially and geographically.
33 The British system of electing members of Parliament though individual constituencies
on a first-past-the-post basis exaggerates the victory. The Conservatives won 56.1% of
the seats but only 43.6% of the votes. The key to that outcome in the 2019 election lay
in the ability of the Conservatives to hold most of the Leave vote, while the Remain
vote was split between Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Greens. Far from being an
overwhelming endorsement of Johnson’s hard Brexit strategy, the majority of voters –
52% – actually voted for parties who were opposed to, or ambivalent, about Brexit.
34 The UK left the EU on 31 January. The UK Government immediately embarked on the
negotiations on the future relationship with the EU with a negotiating position at the
hardest  end  of  the  Brexit  spectrum.  Seeking  a  free  trade  agreement  based  on  the
precedents  of  Canada,  Japan  and  South  Korea,  the  UK  government  has  seemingly
rejected any concession to  a  sense of  a  common European future.  The relationship
envisaged is a purely transactional one, with no overarching treaty, no acceptance that
proximity  and  weight  of  trading  relationship  might  require  a  closer  alignment  of
standards in labour markets, competition policy, state aid and the environment. The
UK government insists on its right to negotiate as an ‘independent’ country, free to
strike its own trade deals across the world without any hindrance from obligations
arising from a trade deal with the EU.
35 With a majority of 80 in Parliament, there is little doubt that the UK government will
face no serious impediment to its negotiating stance from within the UK. Indeed, many
on  the  Conservative  backbenches  will  hold  the  government  to  account  for  the
continued pursuit of a hawkish line. The government seems to view the possibility of a
failure to achieve a trade deal  in 2020 with equanimity,  despite the evident risk of
economic dislocation of a hard switch to trade on WTO terms at the end of the year.
36 It is not just on its own backbenches that the government will be under close scrutiny.
The promise made to the electorate was crystal clear on Brexit. The government will be
watching opinion in those constituencies which were the key to its victory very closely.
That is  why the strength of its  Brexit  commitment has been sustained through the
early  months  of  the  coronavirus  crisis.  The  whole  meaning  of  this  government  is
founded on its unambiguous rejection of a close European future.
 
Challenges ahead
37 How will those who did not vote Conservative adjust to this new reality? The dream of
overturning the 2016 referendum result is dead, at least for the foreseeable future. Does
this mean, then, an end to the Brexit divisions? Will former Remainers accept their
defeat and reconcile themselves to a future for the UK that will be very different to the
one they imagined?
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38 That will be one of the most important political questions in the UK over the next few
years. Economic arguments alone are unlikely to settle the issue. By the government’s
own estimates, the sort of Brexit now being pursued will have an adverse impact on
GDP growth of up to 6.4% over a 15-year time horizon.7 Also by the government’s own
estimates, even an ambitious UK/US trade deal will not offset that loss of growth by
more than 0.16%8 and other trade deals will be even less productive of new growth.
Some sectors  will  be  hard hit  by  the  disruption to  supply  chains  built  up through
seamless trade in the single market. Lost jobs will be visible but lost growth is not;
people are unlikely to miss what they have never had. The causality of the factors that
drive the UK’s economic fortunes in the near term will be hotly disputed and will be
further complicated by the economic shock caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
39 So arguments over the economic impact of Brexit are likely to continue. What then of
the questions of identity and associated values that were in any event more influential
in the election outcome? Does the Conservative victory signal an end to the debate
about how the UK should hold itself in the world?
40 A clue to the answer to that question lies in the demography of the election outcome.
While the Conservatives won more votes than Labour in every social  class,  the age
profile was very different. 57% of 60 to 69 year old’s voted for the Conservatives, but
only 21% of 18 to 24 year old’s.9 As was evident in the EU referendum itself, the younger
part of the population is more likely to be pro-European.10 They are more likely to cite
the environment as a key concern.11 They are more likely to hold socially liberal values.
12 This demographic division is evidenced too in the geography of the election, with the
Conservatives doing relatively less well in London and the other metropolitan cities
and in university towns.
41 In the immediate aftermath of the election and formal exit from the European Union,
there was no banner behind which this swathe of public opinion could rally. Labour was
in no position to articulate a resonant campaign of  opposition,  not least  due to an
interminable  leadership  campaign.  Even now that  Labour has  a  new leader  in  Keir
Starmer, the old tension in the party remains. Although the UK’s departure from the
EU takes one argument off the table, it does not end the tension between the different
values of those with a more socially liberal and internationalist outlook and those who
cleave to a more traditional value set founded on national identity.
42 The  choice  that  Keir  Starmer  makes  for  the  Labour  party  will  be  of  profound
significance for British politics. Does he prioritise an endeavour to compete with the
Conservatives  to  win  back  the  lost  heartlands,  fighting  on  traditional  leftwing
territory? Or does he seek to position the Labour party as the unambiguous standard
bearer of socially liberal values, occupying the opposite pole to the Conservatives on
the new spectrum of identity politics?
43 It will take some time for the Labour party under its new leadership to find its feet,
some time before it is clear whether or not the party can provide a uniting home for
those who feel their values are not represented by the Conservative government. If
Labour fails to rise to that challenge, there will be a vacuum in British politics for the
many  millions,  particularly  of  young  people,  unreconciled  to  Johnson’s  vision  of
Britain’s future. How these people find voice will determine the character of British
politics for many years to come.
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44 But there is a more immediate challenge for Prime Minister Johnson and one in which
the very future of the United Kingdom is at stake.
 
Four elections in one
45 There was not one election in the UK on 12 December, but at least three, arguably four.
46 Politics in Northern Ireland have always danced to a different tune to British politics.
This election, as others before it,  was contested by Northern Ireland’s own political
parties; none of the main British parties has any representation in the province. While
Brexit was an important theme in the campaign, more salient was debate about the
future of Northern Ireland‘s power-sharing Executive which had collapsed in 2017 in
bitter disagreement between the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein.
47 Both parties were punished by the electorate, Sinn Fein losing 6.7% of vote share, the
DUP 5.4%. The DUP lost two seats, Sinn Fein lost one and won one. The big gainers of
the night were the ‘non-aligned’, in particular the Alliance party whose vote share went
up 8.8% and who were rewarded with the taking of a seat off Sinn Fein. In another
significant change, the 7 seats for Sinn Fein and 2 seats for the SDLP mean that for the
first time the Unionists do not have a majority of UK Parliamentary seats.
48 The post-Brexit challenges facing Northern Ireland are immense. The breakthrough in
the negotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement signed by Boris Johnson in October 2019
came through the British acceptance of a de facto economic border down the Irish Sea.
In order to avoid the imposition of a hard border on the island of Ireland, Northern
Ireland will in effect remain part of the Single Market of the EU while at the same time
being  part  of  the  customs  territory  of  the  UK.  This  will  require  as  a  minimum
paperwork for goods moving from Great Britain into Northern Ireland and possibly
physical checks as well. This is a significant change, necessary to preserve the flow of
trade on the island of Ireland but an outcome which overtime will tilt the balance of the
Northern Ireland economy towards the south.
49 Combined with a long-term demographic trend in favour of the nationalist community
and more  open  attitudes  towards  unification  among the  young,  this  sets  Northern
Ireland on an uncertain course. Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, the
Secretary of  State  for  Northern Ireland in the UK government is  obliged to  hold a
border poll if public opinion appears to be in favour of unification. A border poll is
unlikely to be imminent; some recent opinion polls have support for unification at or
close to 50%, but others as low as 35%.13 However, the trend of opinion appears to be
consistent over time, towards support for unification.
50 This  poses  a  challenge  to the  British  government  which  will  last  throughout  this
Parliament and beyond. Prime Minister Johnson still has to wrestle with the complex
and controversial problems of how to manage the Northern Ireland dimension of the
Withdrawal  Agreement;  reaching agreement  with the  European Commission on the
precise management arrangements is  complex.  This  will  keep the Brexit  impact  on
Northern Ireland at the forefront of political concerns. There will be little credit for the
government in whatever outcomes they eventually achieve; opinion on the mainland is
broadly indifferent to the future of Northern Ireland in the UK.14
51 Almost the only certainty about Northern Ireland over the next few years is that it will
continue to demand priority attention from the UK government. How sensitively the
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government responds to those demands could determine whether that trend in favour
of unification is stayed or accelerates.
52 An even more immediate threat to the integrity of the United Kingdom comes from
Scotland. The Conservatives did not win the election in Scotland. Indeed, they lost 7 of
the 13 seats they had won in 2017 and garnered only 25.1% of the vote. The election
instead provided the platform for another sweeping victory for the SNP, who took 45%
of the vote and increased their number of seats by 13 to 48. The Liberal Democrats held
on to only 4 seats and Labour, not so many years ago by far the dominant political
power in Scotland, was reduced to a pitiful single seat.
53 As for the Conservative party at the UK level, normal political expectations would have
suggested that this was an election that should have punished the SNP. In power in
Scotland at the time of the election for over 12 years,  the SNP has presided over a
Scottish government with a less than compelling record in domestic Scottish politics.
With well-advertised failings in education policy and the health service, with recent
controversy over contracts to build ferries and let ferry routes and with the unsavoury
spectre of the trial of former SNP First Minister Alex Salmond on charges of sexual
assault  and  attempted  rape  hanging  over them,  the  SNP was  ripe  for  an  electoral
beating.
54 Yet the SNP reversed the relative set back they had experienced in the 2017 election.
Why were they able to defy electoral gravity?
55 The answer lies  in  that  same shift  of  political  allegiance  towards  choices  based on
identity, a road down which Scotland was already well advanced. The 2014 referendum
on Scottish independence had the same effect on Scottish opinion as did the 2016 EU
referendum across the UK; it divided people around the core question of sovereignty. In
a  test  case  of  how  the  divisions  caused  by  referendums  are  slow  to  heal,  Scottish
opinion on the question of independence did not shift markedly from the 45 for/55
against  outcome of the  2014  referendum until  2019,  when there  was  a  modest  but
sustained increase in support for independence, taking it up to the 50% mark in a series
of polls in early 2020, thereby confirming that Scotland is a land divided down the
middle.15
56 The reasons for the uptick in support for independence seem clear; some people who
voted  no  to  independence  in  2014  and  Remain  in  the  EU referendum have  moved
towards support for independence. There has been a smaller drift the other way, as
Leave voters who had previously supported independence choose to prioritise EU exit
over Scottish independence. But the net result is clear; Brexit has increased support for
independence in Scotland.
57 This is an existential challenge for the Johnson-led government and one that it is ill-
equipped to handle.  His brand of Tory-ism does not travel well  in the north of the
country; there is little prospect of a resurgence of support for the UK Union on the back
of affection for this Conservative government. Meanwhile, at a deeper level, the things
that  once held the concept of  Britishness  together,  Protestant  religion,  empire and
foreign wars, the welfare state and even the armed forces and the monarchy, no longer
resonate in Scotland as they once did.
58 Only the National Health Service still serves as a beacon of British solidarity. Perhaps
the coronavirus crisis will reinforce that last sinew of the UK Union, in time to dent the
hopes of the SNP of winning a majority in the 2021 elections to the Scottish Parliament.
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But it is likely to be a close-run thing. If the SNP and their allies do indeed win that
election on a mandate for another referendum, that will pose a huge challenge to the
UK government which, under the devolution settlement, has to agree to the holding of
a referendum to make it legal.
59 Most  governments  are  remembered  for  things  they  didn’t  expect  or  want  to  be
remembered for. That maxim has already been proved true for Boris Johnson in the
shape of coronavirus. But there could be another longer-lasting and constitutionally
seismic legacy; the very rupture of the Union of the United Kingdom.
60 What about Wales? On the face of it, the 2019 election outcome in Wales reflected the
pattern in England. Labour, for over a century the dominant party in Wales, still topped
the poll in terms of vote share and seats but lost share of both – vote share down 8% to
40.9% and number  of  seats  down 8  to  22.  The  Conservatives  meanwhile  won their
highest ever share of the vote, up 2.5% to 36.1% (and would probably have gone higher
if the Brexit party had not taken 5.4% of the vote) and equalled their previous best tally
of 14 seats, almost wiping Labour out in North Wales.
61 The same factors were in play as in England; a combination of a decisive position on
Brexit and deep distrust of Jeremy Corbyn. Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party,
could not replicate the success of the SNP in Scotland, marginally losing vote share to
9.9%, but hanging on to their four seats.
62 So can Prime Minister Johnson assume that in Wales he will face no serious challenge to
the existing order of the UK, at least for the term of this Parliament? Possibly, but the
nature of Welsh politics is changing too. As elsewhere, identity is thrusting into the
political  equation.  Some  of  that  vote  for  the  Conservatives  is  an  assertion  of
Britishness, particularly on the part of voters of English origins. Part of the problem for
the Labour party in Wales, beaten into third place in the 2019 European Parliamentary
elections by the Brexit party and by Plaid Cymru, is their equivocal position on the
question of identity. 
63 Welsh Labour, particularly under the leadership of Carwyn Jones when he was First
Minster, managed to sit astride the identity line, standing up for Welsh interests while
supporting the Union of the UK. But that was always a weak strategic position. Labour
in Wales risks being outflanked, as Labour has been in Scotland, by the Conservatives
on the one hand as the natural defenders of the Union and Plaid Cymru, now under the
more  dynamic  leadership  of  Adam  Price,  as  the  natural  promoters  of  the  Welsh
national interest.
64 So is Wales on the cusp of the sort of transformation that Scotland has witnessed, with
the collapse of the Labour party and politics realigned on identity lines? The contest in
the 2021 elections to the Senedd, the Welsh Parliament, will be watched with keener
interest than usual in the corridors of Westminster.
65 This  is  not  a  nation  united.  Brexit  has  brought  further  uncertainty  to  the  already
fragile polity of the United Kingdom. With a de facto trade border down the Irish Sea,
the  aftermath of  Brexit  may reinforce  the  existing  slow trend in  Northern Ireland
towards majority support for unification. Scotland is divided, many still bitter at the
foisting of Brexit on a nation that did not vote for it, and with a powerful political force
in the shape of the SNP capable of winning a majority in the 2021 elections to the
Scottish parliament.  The old order in Wales is  showing signs of decay,  with Labour
struggling to assert its traditional dominance.
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66 In England, the cultural divide so brutally exposed by the EU referendum is far from
healed. The Conservatives do not command much support among the young or among
the liberal professionals in the metropolitan areas of England and the university towns
and cities.  The ‘winner-takes-all’  nature of the UK electoral  system exaggerates the
victory.  In  the  face  of  those  divisions,  how  will  the  Conservative  party  choose  to
govern?
67 Far from backing away, the government shows every sign of doubling down. Brexit
remains the touchstone; even in spite of the economic ructions that the coronavirus
pandemic has brought in its wake, the government has resisted calls for an extension of
the transition period or and shows no signs of wishing to negotiate anything other than
a  thin  and  unambitious  trade  deal  with  the  EU.  As  a  political  pitch,  this  is  about
reinforcing its position with its new voter base, not seeking to bridge the divide with
former supporters of Remain.
68 The government seems to recognise that the votes it won from Labour in the North and
Midlands of England have been lent to the Conservatives, not endowed in perpetuity.
The government knows too that it has to persuade by its actions that it will make good
the  perceived  neglect  by  previous  governments  of  those  northern  and  midland
constituencies.  Hence  the  commitment  to  ‘levelling  up’,  with  large  promises of
infrastructure and other investment to close the gap between these regions and the
wealthier  London  and  South  East.  This  takes  a  Conservative  government  into
unfamiliar territory; economically interventionist, fiscally loose.
69 At the same time, the government emphasises its credentials on law and order and
immigration. It celebrates the NHS as an institution of the state. All told, this is about
cementing the position of the party at one end of the spectrum of identity politics;
Brexit  for  national  identity,  the  return  of  the  state  for  security  of  individual  and
community, socially illiberal.
70 Moreover, in their actions in the early weeks after the election, the government acted
in a way that demonstrated that it was not particularly interested in reconciliation.
Burnt  by the ruling of  the Supreme Court  in the case on the decision to  prorogue
Parliament in September 2019, the government has made no secret of its wish to clip
the wings of the judiciary. The threat of a review of the BBC licence fee and the Channel
4 public sector broadcasting licence still hangs in the air.
71 Power has been centralised in No 10. Relations with the Civil Service appear at best
uneven; the unprecedented public resignation of the Permanent Secretary of the Home
Office was a startling exposure of usually hidden tensions. The government also seems
deaf to the concerns of business about its Brexit policy, a strange state of affairs for a
party that once prided itself on its capacity to represent the interests of business in the
process of governing.
72 Even  on  the  existential  issue  of  the  state  of  the  devolved  parts  of  the  UK,  the
government has taken a far from conciliatory line. It appears to be playing fast and
loose with the Northern Ireland protocol, despite the deep sensitivities that accompany
any political uncertainty in the province. There has been no attempt to reach out to the
Scottish or Welsh governments on Brexit or, over their heads, to the people of Scotland
and Wales. The government’s agenda is driven by other political concerns.
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Conclusion
73 Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  coronavirus  pandemic,  all  the  signs  were  that  the
government  intended to  rule  as  it  had  campaigned in the  election,  driving  a  hard
Brexit, appealing to the values and cultural mores of the communities that had found
in  the  campaign  to  leave  the  EU  a  clear  expression  of  their  political  identity.
Coronavirus  complicates  everything,  although it  is  too  early  to  say  that  it  changes
everything, at least in politics. As often in a national crisis, the initial reaction of the
British public was to lock in behind the Prime Minister; Boris Johnson’s ratings soared.
16
74 But the crisis and its aftermath will be long in the resolution. There will be a reckoning,
as  inquiries  examine why decisions  were taken as  they were and apportion blame.
Economic dislocation will cause discontent. Will the government stick to its hardline
approach to Brexit and espousal of divisive identity politics? Or will it relent in the face
of a need for national renewal and seek to reach out across the cultural divide? Will
there be an opportunity for Labour to rekindle the old alliance between the working
class of the north and midlands and the professional classes of the metropolitan areas?
75 What seemed so decisive on the morning of 13 December 2019 no longer looks so clear.
A handsome majority in the House of Commons masks fundamental divisions in the
country. Coronavirus poses challenges unimagined even a few short months ago. Far
from  advancing  on  a  settled  course,  British  politics  continues  to  deal  in  profound
uncertainty.
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4. He snatched the phone off the journalist.
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10. In 2018 19% of 18-34 year olds in favour of leaving compared to 49% of 55+ British Social
















The outcome of  the UK General  Election of  December 2019 was a  substantial  victory for the
Conservative party. Why did the Conservatives win, and win so well, when the party had been
bitterly riven for over three years by deep disagreement about Brexit? This chapter analyses the
reasons  for  that  success  and  asks  what  this  says  about  the  politically  unity  of  the  United
Kingdom. It argues that, beneath the surface of a decisive electoral outcome, the UK remains a
country  divided,  demographically,  socially  and  geographically.  The  future course  of  British
politics remains uncertain.
Le  résultat  des  élections  législatives  britanniques  de  décembre 2019 a  constitué  une victoire
importante pour le parti conservateur. Pourquoi les Conservateurs ont-ils gagné, et avec une
telle ampleur, alors que ce parti avait été âprement déchiré par de profonds désaccords au sujet
du Brexit au cours des trois dernières années? Cet article analyse les raisons de ce succès et sa
signification par rapport à l’unité politique du Royaume-Uni. Il postule que derrière l’apparence
d’un succès électoral décisif, le Royaume-Uni demeure un pays profondément divisé, aux plans
démographique, social et géographique. L’avenir de la politique britannique demeure incertain
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